

WORSENING THE RISK: THE LNG TERMINAL OF GAS NATURAL

To worsen this situation, in 2006 arrives the project of Spanish society Gas Natural, strongly supported by the Italian Government and the Region, for a gas terminal and its storage facilities (two, with a capacity of 140,000 cubic meters) to be built in the Port of Trieste (Zaule) in an area adjacent to the oil terminal and to several other industrial plants at risk. The two storage facilities of the Gas Natural would be only 1 kilometer away from the FERRIERA, 800 meters from the LINDE GAS, 100 meters from the fuel storage of the DCT, one kilometer away from the coastal storage facilities of liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) and oil at the mouth of the Rio Ospo, less than 1.5 kilometers from the ALDER and about 2.5 kilometers from the tanks of the SIOT. Domino effect, so the accident of terroristic attack with a leak of gas and combustion-explosion that would involve all the industrial plants would likely have catastrophic consequences in Trieste, Muggia, Dolina, and it would also affect bordering Slovenia.

Both the gas storage facilities and the oil terminal would be rewarding targets for large-scale terroristic operations. To grant at least minimum safety in case of this kind of events, it would be necessary militarizing, in facts, most of the city and of port access, yet, this would not be sufficient to prevent those terroristic attacks which might easily break through the safeguards in place by military means and methods. The gas storage facilities and the related terminal would be exposed (like the other installations settled in the Province of Trieste) to attacks that might come from the sea (even with divers transporting explosive charges), from land (State Road S.S. 202 passes right next to the FERRIERA, the LINDE GAS, the D.C.T. storage facilities, and the ones to be built by GAS NATURAL) and from the sky (attacks with light aircrafts, which might take off from the highlands, which dominate the city of Trieste, without being possibly intercepted). Also, terroristic attacks might aim to hit not one, but more installations at the same time.

Underestimating the risk of terroristic attacks

Strange enough, in presenting the project for the on shore LNG terminal of the GAS NATURAL the issue of terroristic attacks is extremely underestimated, as if it were obvious that this event is to be considered as simply impossible. This is strange since, right in Trieste, on August 4th, 1972, Palestinian terroristic organization “Black September” has attacked the oil terminal of the SIOT, destroying four tanks and causing serious environmental damages. Environmental damages which were never remedied. That attack showed the vulnerability of this kind of installations (in fact, they are impossible to defend) and also the illogicalness of their position, in the middle of the urban context. Apparently, the lesson has not been learned.

But what is like the security in the installations already settled in the Province of Trieste when it comes to the risk of terroristic attacks? Because this kind of risk is directly related to the implementation of the Seveso Directive, actually, it should be one of its main criteria of evaluation.

And, since no one knows or wants to answer this question, we take care ourselves to make a critical evaluation, and we public it in 2006:

- FERRIERA - IRONWORKS of Servola

Easy to attack from land and sea. It is near a residential area and near the main road of the city (S.S. 202).

- LINDE GAS

Easy to attack from land and sea. It is a rewarding target due to storage facilities of liquid oxygen. It is near a residential area and near the main road of the city (S.S. 202). It is near the FERRIERA.

- D.C.T. (*Depositi Costieri Trieste* - Coastal Storage facilities Trieste)

Easy to attack from land and sea. The storage facilities of mineral oils (hydrocarbons) near the main road of the city (S.S. 202) and next to the area where should be built the storage tanks of the LNG terminal of GAS NATURAL, so they represent a rewarding target.

- SIOT TERMINAL

It is the main oil terminal of the Mediterranean. Obviously it is a rewarding target, with a high strategic value. Easy to attack from land and sea. The LNG terminal would be right next to the SIOT terminal.

- INCINERATOR PLANT

Easy to attack from land and sea. It might be used to spread poison in the atmosphere.

- ALDER

Easy to attack from sea (access from the Zaule canal) and land. A rewarding target due to the presence of hazardous chemicals, like formaldehyde and methanol. In the storehouse it is possible stocking products on behalf of third parties. It is in a residential area.

- D.C.M. (*Depositi petrolio costieri* - Oil Coastal Storage facilities) and G.T.S. (LPG storage facilities)

They are in Aquilinia, easily reached by the nearby streets. Easy to attack.

- SIOT storage facilities

Probably the main target for terroristic attacks, at least until the LNG terminal is built (if that ever happens). In August 1972 this became the target of one of the most serious international terroristic attacks, which caused the destruction of 4 tanks.

They are located in the southern periphery of Trieste, which is a residential area. Easy to attack from various points (side roads and other in the surrounding area).

- Terminal of GAS NATURAL (project)

The two storage facilities - each with a capacity of 140,000 cubic meters - would become one of the main targets of organized terroristic groups. Both the storage facilities and the related terminal would be very vulnerable to attacks from land and sea. The terminal would be in the core of an urban area and right next to other potentially hazardous industrial installation (FERRIERA, LINDE GAS e D.C.T) as well as next to a main road (S.S. 202) city. In case of a simultaneous terroristic attack or an accident involving directly the LINDE GAS, by coming into contact with methane, the liquefied oxygen would strengthen the destructive potential of the cloud of gas, feeding the fire and igniting it (explosion with fireball). In 1984, in Mexico City, happened that 80,000 m³ of LPG leaked from a container,

exploding into a huge fireball, causing the death of 554 people and injuring more than 4,200 others.

But in order to attack vulnerable targets, terroristic organizations could use highly destructive conventional weapons. Just imagine simultaneous attacks with anti-tank weapons, with a good penetration power (a radius up to 1.5 - 2 kilometers and ammunition that can perforate axel armoring up to 0.8 meters). It would be practically impossible setting up defenses against this kind of attacks (rockets could be launched from the hills, even from the ones in Slovenia, as hills dominate the areas in which are settled the storehouses of the industrial plants); it is important not underestimating suicide attacks, which might be conduces by boats, vehicles of aircraft filled with explosives. Also, it would be important not forgetting the risk of actions from the sea, with divers who might place explosive charges even under the gas carriers and oil tankers at berth at the terminals or in the natural port.

Adding one risk to another, uncertainty to uncertainty, seems frankly unacceptable to us. But, even willing to authorize a LNG terminal in the port of Trieste, how what about the Seveso Law, which is not even implemented when it comes to the industrial plants that are already settled?

GRANTING INSECURITY: THE DECEPTIVE SAFERT REPOTS OF INDUSTRIAL PLANTS IN TRIESTE

To have a better understanding of how was is possible presenting the project for a gas terminal in the middle of an already dangerous industrial area, in the core of the port-city of Trieste, there is no other way than checking what do the safety reports of the industrial plants that are already there say. So, we find out lots of interesting things.

For example, the D.C.T. (Coastal Storage facilities Trieste), with, along with its 35 tanks containing diesel, would be only some dozen of meters away from the gas terminal declares, in the report sent to the Municipality of Trieste on October 12th, 2000, that when it comes to major accident hazard:

“The presence of diesel storage tanks, considering its already mentioned capacity (about 47,000 tons.) could trigger a major accident in the event of a fire in one or more tanks, with the consequent emanation of hazardous thermal radiation, explosion overpressure, falling down of fragments.

Incandescent fragments and ashes could fall down on the uncultivated land behind (area of *Monte S. Pantaleone*) causing fires in the vegetation. The effects of this kind of accident might be also worsened by the presence of people and vehicles in the streets behind the tank (out of curiosity or mass panic), in case of sport events in the nearby sport facilities (stadium and indoor stadium).”

It is legitimate being worried, because right next to the D.C.T. there are a factory of liquid oxygen (LINDE GAS) and an iron plant (FERRIERA), also, only some hundreds meters away, there is the SIOT oil terminal. And there are also houses, streets, centers of aggregation, sanitary structures, and schools. For instance: the core of an urban area. Given

this, it is impossible just thinking about building a LNG terminal and the related storage facilities. That safety report of the D.C.T. is really “burning” and it must disappear, or the Gas Natural deal collapses. So it disappears. In the revision of the safety reports, the alarming analysis does “magically” disappear, notwithstanding that the company has increased the quantity of fuel it stocks (now it is more than 51,000 tons.), and the ones responsible for the controls (Prefect Office, Regional Technical Committee Prefect Office, the Fire Brigade) do not notice it. Actually, the society receives the approval for its E.E.P. (External Emergency Plan) even if that lacks the mandatory and complete evaluation of fire risk involving its fuel storage tanks. But even the minimalist guarantors of our safety must admit that a fire in a fuel tank might actually happen and the damages would affect a 100 meters range. But what kind of damage would that be is unknown, because the E.E.P. underlines that “the outcomes of the evaluations of the consequences of the fire were not validated yet”. But since the E.E.P. was adopted on June 25th, 2007 and it should be updated every three years (this is the prescription of the law), and that, by this time, all required drill should have been carried out - with the participation of the concerned population - everything should be completely solved by now, otherwise that prevention are we talking about? No. Still in January 2010, the evaluation of fire risk has not been validated and there is no trace of the mandatory drills. It's better not scaring the people, citizens might start thinking, and then they would realize that building gas tanks with a capacity of 140.000 cubic meters, with movements of several billions liters per year in this powder keg is nothing but madness.

Also, the D.C.T. is not alone. For example, the LINDE GAS produces liquid oxygen and it borders with the D.C.T., but in the E.E.P. approved only on October 25th, 2009 (which means 3 months after the approval of the project presented by Gas Natural) the risk of explosion and fire is reduced to minimum terms, taking into account only the accidental leaking of a minimum quantity of oxygen. For instance, a 25 square meters puddle, while the company can stock up to 1,866 tons of this hazardous material. Do they even realize what would mean the ignition and explosion of 1,866 tonnages of liquid oxygen (which means billions of liters of oxygen gas)? It would be devastation in a range of hundreds and hundreds of meters. Half of the city would be sweep away. This is not the kind of things to play with, unlike the unreliable, local institutions are doing.

On May 21st, 2008 in Bari, a truck transporting 5 cylinders of compressed oxygen and 6 containers of liquid oxygen ignited, unleashing hell in a city street. The chained explosions caused panic among the residents of the area, destroyed the truck completely, caused several damages to 5 cars parked nearby, the facades of some buildings, power and telephone lines. Three families had to leave their homes and seek shelter at relatives or friends. The oxygen cylinders exploded, ending up hundreds of meters away. It was a true miracle that there were no casualties, since there were no people in the street. This is a small accident respect to what could happen within an installation that produces this kind of technical gas. This is the risk that they are hiding to the people.

Also, close to that area there is the Ferriera (ironworks) of Servola, incredibly excluded by the Prefect Office from the industrial plants for which the predisposition of the E.E.P. is

mandatory. Yet, it is the company itself to declare that in case of unconfined explosion of the process gas (breaking of the gasometer) the destructive effect, with damages to properties and persons up to 1,360 meters apart!

If the controllers themselves cheat, it is obvious that the game is distorted and people cannot get a good night's sleep. This is how Gas Natural receives the approval for a project, in perfect violation of the Seveso Directive. For instance, how is it possible calculating domino effect (chained accidents) for those industrial plants, given that they took care to exclude the majority of the consequences of the accidents that might happen there? But it is equally obvious that the citizens will, irrevocably, distrust such institutions.

In the meantime, due to our complaints to the European Union and to judicial authority, the "system" activates and some external emergency plans (E.E.P.s) of certain industrial plants at risk in the Province of Trieste begin to become available, also, they start planning the phases of the training that does not involve only the Police Forces and the Civil Protection, but also the citizens who are exposed to the consequences of possible accidents. The E.E.P.s of four industrial plants falling under Seveso legislation are currently available on the website of the Prefect Office of Trieste.

The first, for limited that they are, drills in the Municipality of Dolina regard the storage tanks of the SIOT.

So, we are in summer 2008, three and a half years after the beginning of our action but, of course, the question on safety is not over yet. Because now there are LNG terminals incoming on the Gulf of Trieste.

THE BUSINESS OF GAS TERMINALS: INTEREST OF STATE OR PRIVATE BUSINESS?

As already seen, the issues of safety and the implementation of the Seveso Directives do inevitably encounter the proposal to turn the port of Trieste in the main national energy hub, by building a LNG terminal next to the oil terminal that is already in existence. But, in facts, the gas terminals in project are two: one in the port, the other in the middle of the gulf, right in front of the coasts of Slovenia. The proposing companies are Gas Natural (terminal in the port) and Endesa - now E.ON - (terminal in the Gulf). It is immediately clear that the two terminals could barely coexist, and our first impression is that they are trying to force the approval of one of the two, using the other to distract public attention and the opponents. Even the behavior of public administrators (the Italian Government and the Region) who firmly argue in favor of the project of Gas Natural in the port of Trieste supports this interpretation.

The terminal of Gas Natural would become part of the industrial zone of Trieste, nestled in the urban fabric and right in front of the town of Muggia.

The terminal of Endesa would be built in the middle of the Gulf of Trieste on an anchored floating plat, which would be 272 meters long, 109 meters wide and 42 meters high, with a 74-meters tower.

But what are the main problems of this kind of facilities, which we bring to the attention of national and European institutions, as well as to the attention of public opinion? Here they are:

1. The two LNG terminals are proposed in absence of the National and Transnational Strategic Energy Plan, prescribed by Community law – envisioned also under Italian and regional laws, but in different terms than Community law – to realize the projects of energy plants, maximizing the power and minimizing the impacts.

2. Both projects avoid or underestimate the risks of natural catastrophes, fires of terroristic attacks, as themselves and in relation to the residential areas, as well as the possible effects of chained explosions (domino effect). When it comes to LNG terminals, both Europe and the U.S. provide safety regulations similar to those of nuclear power plants, including proper safety distances from residential areas (15-18 miles and more), which are not respected in this case, since the concerned areas are densely populated and already subject to enormous security risks.

3. Impact studies confirm that in case of accidental spill of liquid methane (-161 °C) in the sea, by heating, that would violently return to gas, with a nearly immediate regain of volume (explosion without fire): further heating, at about -112 °C it would be lighter than air, forming a cloud that would be easily transported by wind and capable to kill by asphyxiation of freezing even from longer distances; upon reaching a concentrations of gas in air between 5% and 15% the cloud would caught fire, at -58 °C and by coming into contact with any spark or surface above 540 °C, there would be an explosion or instant combustion (flash fire), more devastating as it is closer to residential areas. The projects do not envision special defenses (embankments or similar) to prevent or reduce the contact between leaking liquid gas and seawater. In case of accidental immersion in water, the tanks explode due to the heating and thermal expansion of the gases, and this would have the same consequences described above. In case of a terroristic attack to one of the tanks, almost instantly, 160.000 cubic metes of liquid gas would be released, forming a cloud with a volume of more than half a cubic kilometer.

4. The geological part of the survey is superficial, there are considerable mistakes in the technical description of the sites and there is no stratigraphy. The project of the Endesa platform does also result to be a overhasty adaptation of previous ones, without correct verifications about the site; among those, there is no objective data about the geotechnical nature of the seabed, and there is a subjective evaluation, which includes severe errors, the characteristics to measure its subsistence, stability, bearing capacity, foundation and landing poles, etc.; due to this, that cannot be called a preliminary project, but a mere confirmation of the capacity to handle calculation codes. This is why, when it comes to geological risk, the construction requirements do prudentially refer to the earthquakes that might occur every 10,000 years, not every 500 years like for normal buildings.

5. In the proposed impact studies, the accident calculation rates are unrealistically reductive (the cases provided do only cover some decades), but they are accompanied by an admission of the actual impossibility to forecast accidents, their dynamics and consequences reliably.

6. The risk of terroristic attacks it ignored or minimized, notwithstanding how well known and increasing that is. The National Council for Science and the Environment of the USA considers that LNG terminals, very visible and easily identified, especially when built in vey populated areas, are appealing and vulnerable targets for terrorists. Since 2001, gas and oil pipelines were attacked in at least 6 countries; in Trieste there is a significant precedent, the attack of Black September to the pipeline of the SIOT (1972). There are no specifications on the nature, dimensions, guarantees and consequences of the needed armed security services (military and private) of the terminals, which would lead to a militarization of northern Adriatic, but also of Italian, Slovene, Croatian and international waters, which would consist in the enormous and continuing patrolling of Italian vessels, which would trespass in the territorial waters of Slovenia and Croatia, but there would be also submarine controls and special forces within and around the terminals; also, there is no mentioning of who would bear the massive costs.

7. the entrance and outgoing of each gas carrier from the industrial port of Trieste, would require some hours of long-distance complete blockage of navigation for all other vessels (commercial, touristic and leisure boats), including also the other tankers with hazardous cargos, transiting in the same canal to enter the port. Also, such conditions of not allow the free emergency egress of a gas carrier from its mooring Tin case of a fire or any other danger. Currently, annual traffic is envisioned as 110 300-meters-long vessels, con with a 13.5 meters draught, and the related security calculations were carried out on theoretical models that have rather different characteristics than the site in Trieste. The maneuvering problems of gas carriers in the narrow space available cannot be correctly dealt with, or solved.

8. The previsions as for the entity and lowering of the temperature of the narrow sea basin as well as the pollution by chlorine are underestimated; also, those are by no mean related to the impact assessment, especially on the microclimate areas, the biocenosis and the sea current regime. The evaluation of the effects of introducing enormous quantities of sea water cooled (at least 5° C cooler) and chlorate (daily: more than 650.000 cubic meters, more than 120 kg of chlorine) on the physical, chemical and biological balances of the Gulf of Trieste is approximate and underestimated, lacing a punctual relation of the actual characteristics of the Gulf and its dimensions, those of its inlets (Bay of Muggia) and of the seabed, of the sea current regime and the specific biocenosis. The cooling systems and ballasts of gas carriers are also exposed to a serious risk as for the transportation and diffusion of **Harmful Aquatic Organisms and Pathogens** (HAOP). Draining the seabed, where needed, to allow the access and mooring of gas carriers, would actually put in circulation relevant quantities of sediments with high concentrations of toxic substances, accumulated in the two centuries of port and industrial activities in the Gulf of Trieste; for example, in the central part of the Gulf, the first 90 centimeter's of sediments are contaminated by mercury, important quantities has often been found in fish, and this contradicts the EU Mercury Strategy.

9. The risks and damages consequent from the explosion of either the terminal of the gas carriers in transit near the coast, the cooling and pollution of the sea (including the effects on fishing, fish-farming and tourism) as well as to the increasing, special maritime traffic would extend, for both terminals, to the waters and territory of Slovenia and Croatia.

As for Slovenia, it has already been emphasized the negative impacts of the terminals and the related activities, especially:

- on the safety of maritime traffic from and to the port of Koper – Capodistria, which is also related to the normal presence of tankers with hazardous cargos, directed both to this port and to that of Trieste;
- on the quality of the sea of the Gulf of Trieste, shared by three Countries, as well as including also coastal areas protected under local and European legislation;
- on the marine and tourism economy of the same States.

Soon, as mentioned above, it is clear that political-economic interests are converging on the project of Gas Natural which, among the two terminals, is still the most dangerous as it is within an urban area.

The pressures to have the terminal of Gas Natural approved are tremendous, to the point of leading, notwithstanding the open procedures of evaluation of the national competent bodies (Ministry of the Environment), to ruthless negotiations between the Municipal administration of Trieste and the Spanish company, which are even made public. It is a surreal situation. Now “system Trieste” envisions the possibility to make a big deal and throws itself in a reckless operation of pressing on the Spanish company.

But, on the other side, they are not inexperienced; there is a company that wants to make the heist profit out of other’s weakness and, when it comes to “system Trieste” there are many. Starting with the fact that the area in which the terminal should be built is heavily polluted, on both land and sea, as well as being part of the S.I.N. (*Sito Inquinato Nazionale* - National Polluted Site) of Trieste.

This deal would certainly be convenient for the “system” since, on one side, it would find someone that would sustain the massive costs of the remediation (we are talking about EUR 30-40 million) of a polluted area (with direct liabilities of public administrations), on the other side, it would allow the settling of an important energy industry, which would allow the city to become part of the remunerative business of gas.

As for this, a key role was that of the ACEGAS-APS, the multi-utility of energy and water controlled by the Municipality of Trieste. That is a former municipal-controlled company that the Municipality officially transformed into a private company and listed in stock exchange, maintaining control over it and deferring to it an increasing number of remunerative public services, as well as assigning it to managers closely tied with the political parties who govern the city. So, in this role, they receive control over the company, which instead should be under the exclusive control of elected municipal administrators.

The privatization of the company does manifestly and notoriously hide the improper exercise of profit-making business activities by municipal public administrators, who act as a monopoly and eluding all burdens (remunerations, trade union, social security, taxes) of public works, as well as assuming business risk, even in relation to stock operations, in providing obligatory and primary public services, of which the same Administration is the

institutional guarantee - under both the functional profile and that of public safety - before the community.

The profits of the - for improper that it is - enterprise result to be not entirely re-invested for the rightful benefit of the administered community, which is the actual owner and it is only represented by Municipal authorities (discounted charges, social security for the poorer, improving services - also when it comes to public health and safety, etc.), but to expand the business of the enterprise as itself, and for the advantage of third parties, including sponsorship and advertising, which are unjustified in a monopoly, with obvious influences on the elections when directed to sport teams.

In this “imperfect privatization”, while there result to be no visible advantage for the community, since the services are still the same, if not of inferior quality, while the prices are not so convenient - again, since the company enjoys a monopoly, in spite of the rules of free market - are very clear the advantages that the few “chosen ones” representing the political power gain from it. It is enough taking a look at the handsome paychecks of the administrators of the company. Obviously, all appointments are strictly political. In 2008 the president of the ACEGAS-APS, Massimo Paniccia, is paid Euro 268,841, chief executive Cesare Pillon is paid Euro 314,846 euro, vice president Manlio Romanelli receives Euro 99,244 euro, vice president Domenico Minasola EUR 65,500 euro, director-general Marina Monassi is paid EUR 300,892. Why are there two vice-presidents, a president, a chief executive and a director-general? Aren't those roles the same thing? Probably yes, but it is all about granting a perfect partition of the company, controlled by the Municipalities of Trieste and Padova, so everyone must have their trusted representative. Here, this is the only miracle of privatization: the multiplication of roles and paychecks. The cost of the administrators (including about 10 advisors) and of the managers comes to a total of EUR 2,398,081. Extremely high earnings, for a result that we might call disappointing - using an euphemism: in one year, the company has lost 37% of its stock value, and its net financial positions consists in a negative balance of EUR 332,4 million, on March 31st, 2008.

But as long the citizens, the only “victims” of the fake privatization of fake municipal companies, pay for it, all is well.

The mayor of Trieste, Roberto Dipiazza, in person, discusses the negotiation. On January 19th, 2007 the newspaper of Trieste, *Il Piccolo* writes an article on that, it says: “The first citizen presented himself in *piazza Unità* (location of the City Hall) armed with several letters exchanged with Gas Natural, and he read it to the presents to explain the chance of course about the terminal that the Spanish company wants to realize in the former area of the Esso. So, the con conditional *yes*, approved unanimously by the city council for Gas Natural, yesterday afternoon turned into a firm **no...**” **why?** «The compensation payments, for the advantage of the territory, have not been respected», Dipiazza says... but what are the economic «compensations» that were disappointed? The mayor lists them all, reading the letters exchanged with the president... Municipal administration asked a EUR 4 million royalty for 20 years, to bring ACEGAS-APS in the business with a 15% share and the possibility, again for the multi-utility, to buy 20% of the gas at cost price....”

The following day, again *Il Piccolo*, publishes new declarations of the mayor of Trieste: "... so, last evening, at 7.30PM - during the meeting of the city council - I got a call from the president of Gas Natural, Toca Gutiérrez-Colomer who tell me that yes, we could make the deal. Too late, I answered. They say to be still interested? We note the words of the president. But, unfortunately, to this point, I re-launch...."

Essentially, the mayor took care to receive direct economic compensations (royalties) for the municipal administration, as well as to involve in the business the society it controls, ACEGAS-APS, notwithstanding that the final measure falls under the competences of the State bodies responsible for this. This is when we have a reasonable doubt: given that the mayor has no power as for the authorization process, how comes that he things to be entitled to ask benefits to Gas Natural, and why is the president of this company willing to negotiate? Might it be that in Rome there is someone who supports the mayor in this abnormal "negotiation" so similar to extortion?

The negotiations continue and on July 15th, 2008, once again local newspaper *Il Piccolo*, publishes an article titled: "Regasification, Gas Natural opens to ACEGAS" and continues: "...NEXT STEPS All things that will be discussed in further meetings, more detailed, between the «parties involved». From *Assindustria* to the other economic categories, without forgetting Lucchini-Severstal...."

This opening up is really strange; also, the other economic categories mentioned in the article have no decision power, since the final decision on the project does fall under the exclusive competences of the Public Bodies responsible for that. And then there is the ACEGAS, which is a quoted company, it is very weak since, as we have seen, in one year it has lost no less than 37% of its value, with a financial balance - on March 31st, 2008 - negative by EUR 332.4 million (as reported on monthly magazine *Zeno* No.130, published in July 2008, in article "*Sull'ACEGAS-APS non datecela a bere*" - "ACEGAS-APS: who do they think they are kidding?" by Paolo Zeriali).

The whole operation cannot but arouse legitimate suspicions. In practice, we are facing an attempt to modify the stock value of a listed, state-owned company, by reckless and dull financial operations at the limit of insider trading. And, since when something is unclear it is necessary making light, we take care to report all the "abnormalities" to judicial authorities (Prosecution Office of the Republic and Court of the Accounts) as well as to the body responsible for regulating the Italian securities market, the CONSOB.

This institutional pressing in favor of Gas Natural corresponds an opposite reaction by the organizations that denounce the dangerousness of the intervention. And, of course, we are first in line. We do also present to the responsible bodies dozens of briefs, in which we analyze all critical points of the project, reporting immediately all matters of environmental and landscape incompatibilities, as well as the several violations of both Italian and European laws we found. And we archive results. The Regional Superintendence of the Ministry of Cultural Heritage and Environmental Conservation confirms our comments and expresses an unfavorable opinion on the project of the LNG terminal on grounds of incompatibility with the environmental constraints on the area. But in Rome they are unsatisfied with this result, so they demand that the opinion is changed, and so it happens.

In the end, the rejection changes from final to partial, which means a favorable opinion with reservations. Things like this happen only in Italy.

Due to this, it is clear that if aimed at a merely national campaign we could not expect significant results.

It is right for this reason that our action of opposition to both terminals in the Gulf of Trieste is mainly based on a sustained information campaign that we carry out in bordering Slovenia, where we were able to create an efficient network with local environmental organizations. For instance, both problems have negative consequences also on the two bordering countries (Slovenia and Croatia) and both must undergo a transboundary E.I.A. (Environmental Impact Assessment) procedure. The situation with the media is as well very different. While in Slovenia public opinion is decidedly sided against the terminals, and thanks to our petitions we are able to obtain significant attention from the media, in Italy (in Region Friuli Venezia Giulia) the media are decidedly under the control of the “system” thus the possibility to broadcast relevant news from the “no” side are reduced to a minimum. So, for us (and for whoever opposes to the projects) it is very hard informing the population.

Adding to this media blockade the fact that, on their side, Italian Authorities failed in granting to the citizens their rights to be informed and involved in the decision making process during the E.I.A. procedure, both are granted under Community Law, the result can be but one: there are only a few observations concerning the projects. The very opposite respect to Slovenia, where, other than environmentalists, Government Authorities make available to the citizens all information about the projects, therefore, many observations are presented. This creates a paradoxical situation, due to the uneven treatment of the citizens of two Member States of the European Union in exercising the same rights on the same matters of common interests and in the same period of time.

Due to this, Slovenes are our main allied, and we do our best to support them providing analysis, evaluations and updates to their Government Authorities. In about two years of restless work, we send about 100 reports, mainly to the Ministry of the Environment of Slovenia, but also the members of their parliament and to members of the European Parliament. This prolonged information campaign that we are carrying out is decisive to strengthen the total opposition already expressed by [Ljubljana](#).

And, since Slovenia firmly maintains the firm no to the LNG terminal in the Gulf of Trieste, things get complicate for the project of Gas Natural, despite the extreme sponsorship it benefits in Italy. Also, the action of Slovenia is not limited to confronting with the Italian Government, but it extends to Brussels as well, with integrations being sent to both the European Commission and to the European Parliament. So, the case of LNG terminals in the Gulf of Trieste becomes a diplomatic problem. For the first time, two Member States of the European Union clash because of a “transboundary environmental assessment”.

In July 2008, in this situation, we present a petition to the European Parliament about the projected LNG terminal of Gas Natural on infringement of Community environmental legislation on the environmental impact assessment procedure and on dangerous industrial plants (Seveso Directive). We do also report that approving the project would lead to the violation of the Regulatory Port Plan for the Gulf of Trieste (which does not envisions such

installations) and that, not matter what, this intervention requires the S.E.A. (Strategic Environmental Assessment).

The petition is received (No. 1147/08) and it leads to an investigation, which becomes part of the one that has already been opened after our previous denounce of the infringement of the Seveso directive (petition No. 0483/07). The case is assigned to the Industry, Research and Energy Committee of the European Union, jointly with the European Commission.

Another front on the projected LNG terminal of Gas Natural open in November 2008, due to presentation of a joint complaint to the Prosecution Office of the Republic in Trieste by environmentalist associations and committees (WWF, *Legambiente*, Greenaction Transnational, *Comitato per la salvaguardia del Golfo di Trieste*, *Comitato SOS Muggia*). The alleged offences are very serious: the Spanish company has allegedly “cheated” in order to obtain the approval of the project. The analysis of the study has revealed disconcerting facts, for example, about the authorship of the studies (which is usually impossible to discover), including the studies on the most relevant aspects of environment and public safety. Also, decisive data on the temperature profiles of the sea were misused, in such a way to completely distort the findings of the study – which has a fundamental importance – about the effects of waste waters of the terminal on the Bay of Muggia. There is also evidence of enormous deformities between the conclusions of the original version (in Spanish) and the Italian translation of the same study.

This seems to be a strategy to deceive the functionaries of the various bodies (especially Region Friuli Venezia Giulia and the Italian Ministry of the Environment), which should have critically examined the studies of Gas Natural – Medea, in order to draw from them a judgment on the environmental compatibility of the project.

The investigation (proceeding 16133/09 N), after the preliminary investigation in Trieste, carried out by the *Guardia di Finanza* (Finance Police) and confirming the accusations made by the environmentalists as for the forgery of the documents, is transferred - on request of the Public Prosecutor in charge (Cristina Bacer) - to the competent Prosecution Office of the Republic in Rome (it was in Rome that Gas Natural lodged - at the Ministry of the Environment, the Environmental Impact Study) which, soon (Public Prosecutor Paolo D'Ovidio) takes care to request its dismissal, on April 3rd, 2009.

Strange enough, the very same complaint, presented by the Municipalities of Muggia and Dolina remains under the competence of the Prosecution Office of Trieste (yet, it is dismissed anyways).

So, the Judge for the Preliminary Investigations of Rome rules the dismissal on June 9th, 2009 without scheduling a hearing despite the opposition lodged by the environmentalist organizations; this is because according to the Judge for the Preliminary Investigations, the opposition is inadmissible since only the State could be considered to be the offended party. And it is as much obvious that the State has no intention to obstacle the project of the Spanish society, actually, it strongly supports it. It is not a mystery that behind the project of Gas Natural there are strong government interests, to the point that as for the undue pressure of the Under-Secretary of the Ministry of the Environment, Roberto Menia, on ministerial bodies responsible for issuing the opinion on the LNG terminal (*Commissione di V.I.A* -

E.I.A. Commission) on July 1st, 2009 a question on the matter is brought to the Senate (Della Seta, Pegorer, Blazina).

But there is more than just something perplexing in this proceeding. What seems to clearly be clear is that, despite the offence being confirmed, the case was dismissed. Because there was the governmental authorization of the LNG terminal in the Port of Trieste at stake, and this installation is considered strategic by the national Government, it is a project that must be approved, no matter what: it is political orders. So, certain documents are sent to Rome, and it gets harder for the complainants continuing the lawsuit. And, in facts, we faced many difficulties to access the case file of the criminal proceeding, to the point that, in the end, facing the request of dismissal of the Prosecution Office, we had to lodge an opposition on a blind bases, without seeing the procedural documentation (it was the investigators of the Finance Police, *Sezione Aeronavale* - Aeronautical Department of Trieste, who carried out the investigations, to inform us, verbally, that our allegations were confirmed). But, once again, something is not right. As mentioned before, the complaint was presented by a group of environmentalist organizations, including ours, and, for reasons of convenience, the coordination was entrusted to the WWF. This is because the WWF, through its national office in Rome, which has a legal department, should have had no difficulties follow the proceeding, therefore allowing our prompter intervention even in case of requests of dismissal. Yet, as a matter of fact, when the request of dismissal is actually presented, the lawyers of WWF Italia are unable to obtaining a copy of the case file. At least, this is what they say. This situation continues for two months (early April - early June), until we find out that the Judge of the Preliminary Hearings has dismissed the case. Yet, even after the dismissal of the case, following out reminders, the WWF keeps telling us that it is impossible taking vision of the case file that, in the meantime, ended up in the archive.

Also, in that case file there is what we don't know yet, the burning report of the Finance Police, which questions the legitimacy of the environmental impact study, which is based the opinion of Italian authorities. If that document were made public, the possibility for the LNG terminal of Gas Natural to be approved rapidly would be compromised. In facts, if the project is tainted by severe procedural irregularities, the project should be brought down to zero and it all would have to re-start from scratch. Which means a whole new E.I.A. procedure, which would take at leaf three more years. And the Spanish company has no time for that. This means a project worth EUR 600 million in at stake.

But, despite the reassuring of the WWF, we would never receive the documents. And, in the meantime, with a way too suspicious synchronization, the project of Gas Natural does quickly reach the conclusion of the authorization process. On June 23, two weeks after the dismissal (ruled on June 9th) of the criminal proceeding by the Judge of the Preliminary Investigations, the *Commissione Tecnica di V.I.A.* (Technical Commission of E.I.A.) of the Ministry of the Environment expresses the final and decisive favorable opinion on the LNG terminal of Gas Natural in the Port of Trieste, followed, on 17 July 2009, the authorization decree of the Minister of the Environment, Prestigiacomo.

Now, all doors are opened wide for the LNG terminal. But we have intention to give up. We do directly demand to the Court of Rome a copy of the case file, delegating this task to a lawyer of the Court of Rome, and we receive it in one week. Is it possible that we succeed

where the WWF failed for three months? The answer is right in the case file. The WWF has never requested to take vision to it, nor did it request copies. That's it: we were fooled and, as we were blocked, the project was approved.

We can finally study the fatal report of the Finance Police, the one that made many hands tremble. In facts, the State Police had demanded the commitment for trial of the environmental impact study (E.I.S.) of the projected terminal of Gas Natural for alleged offences ranging from deception to attempt to commit an offence and falsification of a public document. According to the Finance Police, the conducts of the professionals involved are such to substantially alter the environmental impact study in order to deceive the authorities responsible to verify the projects and release the authorizations. In the conclusions of the State Police, they underline that one of the two authors of the E.I.S. allegedly presented data that does not correspond with the truth in order to: «[...] *make credible* “(...) *providing a suitable, technical answer to demonstrate the environmental compatibility of the disposal of cold waste water in the Bay of Muggia* (...)” the new study, dated 2008 which, in facts, tricked the Ministry of the Environment into adopted decision No. 73 of 20.06.2008, containing the favorable opinion on environmental compatibility of the project a for the construction and functioning of the GNL terminal GNL of Zaule (TS) [...]».

But, as we know, the requests of the Finance Police remain on paper and, in spite of decisive evidences, the case is dismissed, granting impunity to both the advisors and managers of Gas Natural, as well as to the politicians who are their accomplices in Italy. And the protections do not end here. Because it results that the Prosecution Office of the Republic in Trieste, on March 17th, 2009 (which means one day before sending the case file forward to the Prosecution Office of Milano) sent a copy of part of the file to the Ministry of the Environment and for the Protection of the Land and the Sea «for the decisions and considerations of your concern».

This probably is an inadmissible violation of the investigation secrecy, committed by even handing over the acts of the investigations to one of the bodies that is among the investigated parties, in particular, to the Under-Secretary of the Ministry of the Environment, Triestine Roberto Menia, who is one of the min supporters of Gas Natural.

This severe breach and its date make it reasonable suspecting that it was the Ministry, or others connected with the Italian Government, to obtain that the Prosecution Office of Rome abnormally blocked the investigates with the request to dismiss the case presented on April 3rd, 2009.

This means that the Ministry of the Environment ha approved a project on the bases of falsified document and despite being informed of that. But it seems that nobody is worried about it: all that matters is that the deal foes on. And they really have nothing to worry about, since judicial authorities cover them. This is Italy: the homeland of illegality. So, once again, all that remains is Europe.

And we do not go before European authorities alone. Alpe Adria Green, the international environmentalist organization that we are part of as co-founders presents a petition to the European Union and a complaint to the European Commission. All the deceptions hidden by

Government authorities in Italy are finally exposed in Brussels. A damning dossier on the fraud of the project of the contested gas terminal authorized by Italy with scandalous fabrications is also denounced to public opinion in Slovenia and sent to the authorities of the Country. The effect is immediate. In Slovenia, media work well, the way it normally happens in democratic States (we are no longer used to this, in Italy), and the news it presented with an uproar. The Slovene Government reacts to this, tightening up their position against “any project” of LNG terminals in the Gulf of Trieste. And in Italy, this unexpected reaction gets on the nerves of many people. How comes that small Slovenia dares to obstacle the energy policy of big Italy? This irritation becomes tangible following the ‘domesticated’ Italian media, which switch from their usual ‘State disinformation’ a-la golden period of the *Pravda*, to more and more aggressive campaigns against those environmentalists who are regarded to as collaborators of the enemy (who would be Slovenia). And who, better than our organization, perfectly fits with this patriotic feature? We are the main opponents of the LNG terminals in the Gulf of Trieste and, being a transnational group, we have solid foundations in Slovenia. So, when censorship is not enough, they openly attack. This is what happens when a regional TV station (Antenna 3), during a show dedicated to LNG terminals, portrays us as ‘ecoterrorists’ and traitors of national interest. The arrival of Gas Natural in Trieste, where it establishes its “registered office” in order to boost the project at best, does obviously lead to an intensification of the mass-campaigns of disinformation. On a local TV (Telequattro) goes as far as broadcasting spots to support the project of the Spanish company, disguising those ad documentaries. And things are not much better on the so-called public television, the RAI, where the only unfiltered information comes from the political, national or government circles that support the LNG terminal.

But, in parallel with this kind of aggressive campaigns of disinformation, tension towards us rises. From Slovenia, reliable sources inform us about rumored illegal actions that would be in progress against us, especially against my person. This is what an informant refers: “I spoke with one of my colleagues in Trieste, who is still active. He told me that all Italian services received an indication to fuck Roberto Giurastante of AAG. He has become a factor of excessive disturbance for Italian official bodies.”

This is an alarming signal. Someone is losing their nerves. But, when you are a target of secret services, whose protection can you seek? You must be careful, always careful. But, in the end, you know that all your worries are rather useless. Yet, the best form of defense is to make public all that happens. If your case becomes of public domain, the services have no longer that much space for their ruthless operations. But, no matter what, you are always under attack. This is how pressure increases, until on April 6th, 2010 it escalates into tough mafia-style intimidation. In front of the door of my home, I find the little, bloody head of a goat, with truncated horns and snarly smashed mouth. The macabre warning comes in the middle of the day. The message is clear: we can kill you whenever we want, and nobody can protect you.

It is the first time that something like this happens in Trieste. But institutions do not react. Nobody takes action to distance from the authors of the crime or to show solidarity (which is received only from a few citizens) to the one who had to face the odious act of intimidation. A silence which resembles connivance. But the question is, with whom? Was it

really the mafia behind this act of intimidation, or was it the hand of deviated services? The deafening silence of the institutions make it legitimate being suspicious.

The very conduction of the investigations by judicial authority supports the worst suspicions. The case, assigned to Public Prosecutor P.M. Pietro Montrone and deferred to the Legal Police of the Carabinieri, is closed in the record time of 38 days and, as usual, there are no results. For instance, as early as on May 14th, the P.M. demands the dismissal of the case.

But the investigations of the police, lasting only from April 6 to April 30, result to consist in a mere collection of information about me and from the website of the organization that I represent, Greenaction Transnational. No investigative reasoning took place in order to identify suspect subjects or environments, which might be disturbed by my activities to denounce criminality, no involvement of the DIA (*Direzione Investigativa Antimafia* - Anti-Mafia Investigative Directorate). There were no inspections of the Scientific Police on the *corpus delicti* (the head of the goat), which might have provided useful elements to identify its origin; also, those inspections result to have been requested by the police, but only limited to veterinary matters, yet, incredibly, the Public Prosecutor rejected this request. And all of this in regard to a threaten that was recognized as serious and mafia-style in the definition of the alleged offence that is under investigation. To complete this 'depressing' investigative framework, the police requested to the Public Prosecutor, in the place of scientific analysis, the authorization to destroy the *corpus delicti*, and the Public Prosecutor did indeed authorize that (on May 5th, 2010), thus frustrating the possibility - and my predictable request - of the necessary verifications by forensic laboratories.

The very motivation of the request of dismissal is debatable, as it says that "the authors of the serious threaten against GIURASTANTE remained unknown and, currently, there is no evidence – also as a result of the declaration of the offended party, verbalized by the Carabinieri – that further investigations can lead to actual investigative results." adding that "given this framework, it seems useless giving play to the technical ascertainment (suggested by the Legal Police in the note of 30.4.2010) on the severed head goat, in order to identify the place of provenance of the animal killed, due to the manifest lack of actual meaning that this data, even if acquired, would have in the investigation".

Due to this, the request of dismissal results manifestly unfounded, and the second part expresses an absurd investigative position, consolidated with the arbitrary destruction of the *corpus delicti*.

This investigation is at least pedant. But the judge responsible for the investigations could have not even work on it; actually, he should have refrained from the case, as he was undergoing a disciplinary inquiry (the details are in the next chapter) due to a complaint presented by me (offended person) concerning other investigations. Also, this situation was known to the designating Chief Prosecutor of the Republic, Michele Dalla Costa (brother-in-law of Nicolò Ghedini, parliamentarian as well as powerful lawyer of *premier* Berlusconi) who, at the time of the facts, had already taken the duties of his predecessor, Nicola Maria Pace. A copy of the complaint against Mr. Montrone and other officers of the State Police in Trieste (Carabinieri and City Police) had been correctly sent to him. Due to

this, he should have not assigned the case to the judge subject to the investigation (as provided by article 11 of the Italian Code of Criminal Procedure).

This attitude and behavior of the Prosecution Office did therefore preclude any possibility to identify the perpetrators of this threaten, worsening the state of danger confirmed by the same serious mafia-style threaten.

ENERGY AND CIVIL RIGHTS: GAS NATURAL UNDER ACUSE. IS THIS THE POLICY OF THE EUROPEAN UNION?

Among the greatest threatens for the social and environmental equilibrium of the planet, there are energy resources-hunting multinationals, which attract the investments hiding money laundering of mafias, assert themselves in the poorest and most corrupted countries with money but, in the poorest and most unsafe areas of the world, like in Africa or Latin America, they do also rely on paramilitaries and other criminal gangs to repress and assassinate their opponents as well as uneasy indigenous populations.

Therefore, even in Europe, before negotiating any project with a multinational of energy (but this is true also for other sectors) it is necessary carefully evaluating its overall credentials as for ethics, democracy, legality and its respect for the environment.

Multinational Gas Natural-Union Fenosa (the second one incorporated with a merger) which, thanks to political support, wants to install in Trieste its own methane terminal in spite of the opposition on the local level as well as in Italy and Slovenia, is under accuse for subtracting energy resources from poor populations of Latin America by charging enormous prices, as well as to be involved in recent assassinations of opponents. For instance, in Guatemala, the movement which opposes to the monopoly on energy held by this company by demanding the nationalization of public services, had to undergo increasing threatens and repression, which culminated in the assassination of the leaders of the protest. Due to this, a wide spread international campaign is demanding the expulsion of Gas Natural-Union Fenosa from Guatemala.

Along with international and Latin-American environmentalist and human rights organization, also the institutions of the European Community intervened on the case, especially due to being addressed by the Observatory for the Protection of Human Rights Defenders (CIFCA), by the World Organisation Against Torture (OMCT) and the International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH).

As early as in May 2010, following a complaint of the Friends of the Earth Guatemala and other non-government organizations, in Spain, the Permanent Peoples' Tribunal issued a firm ethical condemnation against Gas Natural-Union Fenosa for violating the rights of indigenous communities and for causing serious environmental damages.

The Permanent Peoples' Tribunal is the independent international ethical Court that in 1979 substituted the International Criminal Court ("Russel Tribunal"). It acts international law on human rights and on the rights on indigenous people, upon complaint of with its own commissions of inquiry.

While the projected LNG terminal in Trieste and its forged documents are secured and receives a loving push to approval, two catastrophic accidents take place, showing once again, just in case, how dangerous gas is and how illogical it is settling huge energy terminals in urban areas. This is because contrarily to the claims of the rather uninformed local politicians, who are so busy in promoting the LNG terminals, gas explodes, and this has devastating consequences.

The first accident occurs in Italy. On June 30th, 2009 in the middle of the night, a freight train with LPG tank wagons derailed at the train station of Viareggio. Some several cubic meters (about 50) of gas, leaked from the tank, exploded and caught fire: it's hell. 32 people lost their lives, dozens were injured, 228 buildings were damaged, including 81 houses, hundreds of people were displaced: like a war scene.

The second accident occurs in the United States. On February 7th, 2010 during the testing of the Kleen Energy System Power Station in Connecticut, a leak of gas triggered a violent explosion, which destroyed the 620-megawatt installation. Six were killed, many were injured. The power station had been built in an isolated area, at a minimum distance of about 6 kilometers from the city of Middletown. And it is only because of this that the consequences of the terrible accident are limited and the only victims are employees. Yet, the destructive power of this kind of explosion is clear: the shock wave broke the windows of the Riverview Hospital, which is 2.2 kilometers away from the power plant. The explosion was clearly heard in the nearby town where, even if it did not cause damages, it had the effects of an earthquake.

In Trieste, the LNG terminal with a capacity of 8 billion cubic meters per year of Gas Natural (with two tanks with a capacity of 140,000 cubic meters each) would be in the middle of a residential area and it would be connected with a 400 megawatt turbo gas plant, which would be built near the same terminal that would fuel it. In a range of 2 kilometers from this 'gas hub' there are 7 very hazardous industrial plants (oil, liquid oxygen, formaldehyde, LPG). And the LNG terminal would border with the oil terminal. Every year, hundreds of gas carriers and oil tankers would crowd the narrow entrance canal of the Port of Trieste. What would happen if thousands of cubic meters of gas, leaked due to an accident either on the gas carriers or the tanks, ignited right above the city of Trieste and ignited, with burning clouds, the other industrial installations as well as the tanks of crude oil of the main oil terminal of the Mediterranean? How many people would die? 10,000? 100,000? Why are the citizens not informed in the terms prescribed by the Seveso Directive?

Obviously, none of the questions will ever be answered, because only by keeping the people completely unaware this system of illegality of State can continue to prosper, undisturbed, on the suffering of citizens-servants.

Let it (Mafia) rip: when gas attracts the interest of Cosa Nostra

The business of LNG terminals must be as well evaluated in the light of the attempts to enter the sector of energy performed by organized criminality. Gas is among the most profitable products and this is why it most certainly cannot run from the tentacles of the various, criminal organizations which most certainly Italy has in abundance. And right Gas

Natural results to be involved in an operation bearing signs of Mafia. Mafia DOC of course, since the bonds do even link back to Bernardo Provenzano. The “super boss” would have controlled the realization of several gas pipelines in Sicily, through a company established with this very purpose: the *Gasdotti Azienda Siciliana* [Pipeline Company Sicily] better known as GAS. But this would have been just the beginning of an attempt to climb the sector of energy up to the international level. The objective was the gas of Kazakhstan, to be purchased and then sold to BG, third oil company in the UK, exploiting the pipeline of Russian company Gazprom, the leading world producer of natural gas. The initial business involving \$ 146 million for 1 billion of cubic meters of gas would have allowed *Cosa Nostra* to enter in the social gathering of the international trade of energy. The previsions were ambitious: 6 billions of cubic meters of gas each year would have lead to incomes above EUR 876 billion. The GAS S.p.a. was founded in 1981 and it soon became the main, private supplier of gas in Sicily, counting 93,000 customers in 73 towns. A company grown in the shadow of the Mayor of Palermo, Vito Ciancimino, a trusted man of Provenzano; then its management is handled by lawyer Gianni Lapis. After the death of Vito Ciancimino, the management of business passed down to his son Massimo which has been among the authors of the operation that, on January 13rd, 2004, lead to selling GAS to Spanish company Gas Natural for the amount of EUR 116 million. The incomes of the trading of the GAS were then reinvested through the Sirco society in a series of operations which lead to the purchase of Rumanian company KRIS, leader as for the sector of waste disposal, but also to the purchase of half of the LP GAS, Serbian society which supplies gas in Belgrade. And ‘going Balkan’ might possibly be the link between the interests of *Cosa Nostra* and the LNG terminal of Trieste. As for the business of the gas terminal, an important role would be played by ACEGAS-APS multi-utility involved in bot waste and energy and controlled by the Municipalities of Trieste and Padova, a company, which is working hard to expand in the Balkan market. The LNG terminal of Trieste would be in a strategic position and it would have a capacity of 8 billion cubic meters of gas each year, which would allow entering, by force, the Balkans, where *Cosa Nostra* is attempting to settle down.